The Face of Crime: The Life and Death of Roman Shukhevych | Damian Karol Markowski - Instytut Pileckiego

In recent years, the Ukrainian central and local authorities have been actively commemorating Roman Shukhevych, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), perceiving him as a powerful symbol of the fight for Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union. Within the last few months, President Zelenskyy named a military unit after the UPA, while the Lviv Oblast Council declared 2027 as the year of the UPA and Roman Shukhevych. Crucially, however, Shukhevych – the head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the commander of the UPA, and the deputy commander of the Nachtigall Battalion – had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany and was responsible for ethnic cleansings, pogroms of Lwów Jews, and the mass murder of Polish civilians in Volhynia in 1943. Among others, he was the author of an explicit order to murder civilians. We look back at his life story and involvement in these and other crimes.

Youth and activity in the OUN

Roman Shukhevych was born on 30 June 1907 in Krakowiec, a small Galician town near Jaworów, into a family of Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose many members were actively involved in the cultural, economic, and political life of their nation. Among his relatives were numerous lawyers, physicians, social activists, and Greek Catholic clergymen. He was raised in Lwów, a city which, although dominated by Poles and Polish culture, became the “Piedmont” of the Ukrainian national movement.

Shukhevych was too young to participate in the Ukrainian National Revolution of 1917–1921, during which the older generation engaged in an armed and political struggle to put Ukraine on the map of Europe. He was nothing but a helpless witness to the defeat of the Ukrainian Galician Army by the Polish Army in the battles for Lwów and Eastern Galicia, the collapse of Ukrainian statehood on the Dnieper, and, finally, the Bolshevik occupation of most of Ukraine.

In the 1920s, Shukhevych engaged himself in the activities of the Lwów branch of the Plast National Scout Organization of Ukraine, which sought to instill a patriotic and military spirit in the youth. He was intelligent, athletic, and mindful of the goal that guided generations of Ukrainian patriots and soldiers, who had nevertheless failed to secure an independent Ukraine. He attended an elite classical gymnasium, and in 1926 enrolled at the Lwów University of Technology, graduating from the Faculty of Bridge Construction. Shukhevych showed promise to become yet another great representative of his nation’s interest in his family line.

Simultaneously, however, Shukhevych remained under the influence of older and increasingly more radical activists of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which was banned in Poland. Its members sought to break away from the Polish Republic the territories they considered ethnically Ukrainian. 

The UVO gave rise to an even more radical movement – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Its representatives aimed to appeal to the Ukrainians who constituted the majority of the population in the eastern voivodeships of the Second Polish Republic, that is, those of Stanisławów, Tarnopol and Volhynia, and almost half of the population of the Lwów Voivodeship, which was artificially extended to the west. Members of the OUN sought to foment animosity and sever all ties with Poles. Taking advantage of the unsuccessful policy of the Polish state, which envisioned limiting the rights of Ukrainians to culture and education, and also bringing about their Polonization, the OUN won over the hearts and minds of many citizens of the Second Polish Republic who were of Ukrainian origin. State repressions, which targeted the Ukrainian population indiscriminately, made it possible for the nationalists to channel public anger.

The organization did not shy away from acts of terror and political assassinations. Shukhevych shone among its most radical members, finding common ground with the charismatic Stepan Bandera, among others. As one of the leaders of the combat section, he participated in numerous armed operations, including the assassination of school superintendent Stanisław Sobiński. He also organized the assassination of Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, as well as numerous post office raids. Shukhevych was arrested by the State Police and spent six months in the Bereza Kartuska detention camp. He was sentenced to three years in prison, but was released before serving the full term.

Towards the end of 1938, Shukhevych fled across the green border to Carpathian Ruthenia. He did not act of his own accord, however, but on the orders of the organization, within which he was building his position. He took part in establishing the armed forces of Carpatho-Ukraine – a quasi-state that was liquidated by Hungarian troops after the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Shukhevych managed to flee to Vienna, where he awaited further developments.

Collaboration with the Nazi Third Reich

Following the German invasion of Poland, Shukhevych remained in contact with the Nazi intelligence services. In Kraków, he oversaw the preparation of Ukrainian nationalist cadres for the expected war with the Soviet Union. From 1940, Shukhevych served as head of the OUN for the General Government, which was formed by Nazi Germany from the central part of the occupied Polish territories. After the OUN split over a disagreement as to future operations, Shukhevych sided with the more radical faction led by Stepan Bandera. This secured his further rise through the ranks of the organization.

In 1941, Shukhevych was appointed deputy commander of the Nachtigall Battalion, which was composed of Ukrainians. The unit operated within the “Brandenburg” sabotage and reconnaissance regiment, and was intended to play a special role during the Wehrmacht’s advance into Ukrainian-populated territories, demonstrating their brotherhood-in-arms with the Germans and assisting the German forces with their knowledge of the terrain and local conditions. Shukhevych entered Lwów together with the battalion after the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities. His soldiers took part in the Lwów pogroms, participating in summary executions and massacres of the Jewish population, though not operating as a distinct military unit. However, at least two cases of mass shootings of Jews were documented in the following weeks. Roman Shukhevych’s role in these events remains unclear. 

A self-proclaimed Ukrainian government, formed by the OUN in Lwów after the city was liberated from Soviet occupation, appointed Shukhevych as Minister of Military Affairs. While members of the would-be cabinet and Stepan Bandera were soon arrested by the Gestapo, the deputy commander of the Nachtigall Battalion avoided this fate. Despite the German crackdown on the exposed OUN structures, Shukhevych remained in the service of the Nazis. Part of the unit’s personnel was subsequently reorganized into Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 – an auxiliary force tasked with securing the rear of the German troops.

Shukhevych served with the battalion for the next year and a half. He did so voluntarily, being promoted to the rank of captain and appointed a company commander. Operating as a sub-unit of the 201st Security Division, the battalion was subordinate to SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and Police Leader in the area of responsibility of Army Group Center. Von dem Bach-Zelewski later “made his name” as the butcher of the Warsaw Uprising. The division was sent to Belarus, where it carried out both policing duties and brutal pacifications in the areas of activity of Soviet partisans. Shukhevych’s battalion participated in war crimes and massacres of Jews, who were murdered as part of the so-called final solution of the Jewish question.

Responsibility for mass ethnic cleansings

After completing his service with the Germans (Shukhevych had a fixed-term contract with Battalion 201, which he chose not to renew), he went into hiding, fearing arrest for his activities in the OUN as the Gestapo escalated its crackdown on the Ukrainian underground towards the end of 1942 (as a side note, in May 1943 Shukhevych was recognized as the “main providnyk” (leader) of the Banderite faction of the OUN). He advocated for launching an armed struggle, considering Poles to be among the most dangerous enemies. The underground leadership decided to attack the Poles along the ethnic border in the spring of 1943, killing some and forcing the rest to flee westward, thereby ethnically cleansing the area. In practice, however, it turned out that the nationalists and the peasant population – who frequently joined them – sought first and foremost to murder as many of their Catholic neighbors as possible, often preventing them from escaping. It remains possible that the massacre of Poles in Volhynia took on such monstrous proportions following a tacit agreement between Shukhevych and the local UPA commander, Dmytro Klyachkivsky, known as “Klym Savur”, who advocated for a ruthless cleansing. By the end of 1943, at least 33,000 Poles had perished in Volhynia, mostly women and children. The crimes committed on the helpless civilians were often extremely brutal, involving horrific displays of sadism by the perpetrators.

The UPA fought on multiple fronts. Its forces, whose ranks swelled as a result of the mass mobilization of Ukrainian peasants and desertions from the Ukrainische Hilfspolizei (Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, a collaborationist formation serving the Nazis), engaged in heavy combat with German penal expeditions. The Ukrainians also continued to fight Soviet partisans and attack the Polish population, ruthlessly annihilating whole villages. The peak of the crime came on the Sunday of 11 July, when UPA forces and Ukrainian peasants attacked several dozen Polish settlements, killing at least 7,000 people. The victims were murdered everywhere: during Sunday masses, in their homes, and in the fields and forests, where they had fled seeking refuge. By fall of that year, only a few islands of Polishness remained in Volhynia in the form of self-defense bases and larger towns with German garrisons.

Shukhevych played a crucial role during a meeting of the OUN leadership held to discuss the consequences of the “misinterpretation on the ground” of the organization’s orders concerning the Polish question. He took the side of Dmytro Klyachkivsky, pseudonym “Klym Savur”, who was responsible for the massacres of Poles in Volhynia. Shukhevych inspected the insurgent units in October 1943, and was impressed by how they had grown. Influenced by these experiences, probably in December of that year, Shukhevych persuaded the OUN leadership to extend the “anti-Polish operation” to Eastern Galicia. 

In theory, the cleansing was supposed to become less brutal: killing women and children was forbidden, and Poles were to be attacked only if they ignored calls to flee to the west. In practice, however, many of the assaults were similar to those in Volhynia. “The murders are taking on a Volhynian character”, stated one of the Polish reports from February 1944. Due to the Home Army’s counter-action and the fact that there was a larger number of Poles in the region, the outcome of the “anti-Polish operation” fell short of its organizers’ expectations. In May, the UPA commander repeated his instructions regarding the fate of Poles:

In view of the official position of the Polish government on cooperation with the Soviets, Poles should be removed from our lands. This is to be understood as follows: the Polish population is to be ordered to move to indigenous Polish territory within a few days. If they fail to comply, hit squads are to be dispatched to eliminate the men and burn down (or dismantle) their cottages and property.

There is no question that subsequent UPA orders were issued only with his consent. One of them regarded the killing of Jews who had survived the Holocaust. Most likely, it was also by Shukhevych’s decision that Jewish individuals who had remained in the partisan units because of their valuable skills (medical, shoemaking, etc.) were executed.

Mass attacks on Poles continued on Shukhevych’s orders until June 1945, with isolated executions carried out even after that date. In total, no less than 36,000 people perished as part of the “anti-Polish operation” in Volhynia, while in Eastern Galicia – at least 31,500 (these estimates do not include victims murdered by Ukrainian collaborationist formations). It must be emphasized that the above figures are minimum estimates and do not cover the territories of postwar Poland. What is more, many people were abducted and disappeared without a trace.

Towards the end of the war, Shukhevych decided that it was necessary to reach an understanding with the Germans, as the Soviets remained the greatest enemy. In June 1944, the UPA command and the Abwehr concluded an agreement in Lwów. As a result, fighting with German forces soon ceased, intelligence cooperation was established, and the Ukrainian partisans received massive amounts of arms and ammunition, including cannons, mortars, and machine guns. Cooperation lasted until March 1945 and resulted, among others, in the release of Stepan Bandera and other prominent figures of the nationalist movement from German prisons.

Defeat and death

Towards the end of the war, Shukhevych made an attempt to democratize the Ukrainian nationalist movement. A political body known as the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was then established. In practice, this entity was entirely dependent on the leader of the OUN and commander of the UPA, and served to legitimize these formations in the eyes of the victorious Western Allies. The latter, however, showed no interest in intervening on behalf of the Ukrainian cause.

On Shukhevych’s orders (he used various pseudonyms at the time: “Tur”, “Dzvin”, “Taras Chuprynka”), the UPA commenced partisan warfare against Soviet forces, which were driving the Germans out of the territory of present-day Western Ukraine. The insurgents sought to capitalize on the element of surprise, but lost all advantage when engaging the enemy in open combat. Over time, it became clear that even numerous, highly motivated and heavily armed partisan units stood no chance against well-trained regular forces or elite NKVD troops that could count on armored, artillery, and even aerial support. In the dozens of battles that followed, the UPA was consistently defeated by the Soviet forces.

The guerilla campaign continued until the spring of 1946, when the majority of the partisan troops were annihilated. The UPA de facto ceased operations, except for the Carpathian region. The struggle was carried on by the OUN armed underground, which had its own units, including Sluzhba Bezpeky (intelligence service) hit squads. Shukhevych decreed that no mercy be shown to traitors. The mere suspicion of treason was sufficient to bring about the execution of an individual and their entire family, including small children. Between 1944 and 1951, at least 22,000 Ukrainians died at the hands of the OUN underground. In many cases, their only “fault” was a desire to go back to normal life. Eventually, it became clear that the resistance stood no chance of victory. The movement suffered heavy losses: tens of thousands of partisans and conspirators perished, hundreds of thousands were subjected to various forms of repression, and more than 200,000 people were deported to remote regions of the USSR as “families of the bandits”. By the late 1940s, the OUN was dying.

A specialized unit of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB) spent a long time tracking down the chief leader of the Banderite underground in Western Ukraine. A complex counter-intelligence game ultimately allowed the Soviets to trace Shukhevych’s communication network, which led them to the man himself. On 5 March 1950, an action group discovered “Taras Chuprynka’s” hiding place in one of the houses in the village of Bilohorshcha near Lviv. Shukhevych refused to be taken alive. He opened fire on the attackers, killing one of them, but was promptly gunned down by other soldiers. A series of identification photographs was taken of his corpse, which was probably subsequently burned.

Whitewashing: the posthumous legend

Roman Shukhevych’s family was imprisoned and subjected to repressions for many years. His son, Yuri, lost his sight as a result of prolonged imprisonment. After Ukraine became an independent country, he participated in efforts to rehabilitate his father and other members of the OUN and UPA. He was also politically active in nationalist circles. As some Ukrainians moved away from the distorted Soviet version of history, there has been an increased tendency to emphasize the role of nationalists in the country’s recent history.

In 2007, Roman Shukhevych was recognized as a Hero of Ukraine, but the decision was revoked by one Ukrainian court. Presently, the former UPA leader is particularly revered in Western Ukraine. In an ironic twist of fate, one of his busts was embedded into the façade of a Polish high school in Lviv. Shukhevych has streets named after him in at least seven Ukrainian cities, as well as at least three monuments and about a dozen memorial plaques.

Nationalistically-inclined Ukrainian historians reject arguments concerning the criminal nature of Shukhevych’s activities, his anti-Semitism, and the disregard shown for the lives of his own people during the post-war partisan campaign conducted against the Soviet Union. In their publications, “Taras Chuprynka” is depicted as a flawless man, a steadfast freedom fighter, and one of the most important Ukrainian patriotic activists in the history of the state and the nation.

Roman Shukhevych has always been and will likely remain a divisive figure between Poles and Ukrainians. This is inevitable, however, in the case of someone who is responsible for the committal of mass crimes against civilians and collaboration with German Nazis.

Damian Karol Markowski, Ph.D.